This paper reviews and critiques the positive accounting literature following publication of Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979). The 1978 paper helped generate the positive accounting literature which offers an explanation of accounting practice, suggests the importance of contracting costs, and has led to the discovery of some previously unkown empirical regularities. The 1979 paper produced a methodological debate that has not been very productive.
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Showing posts with label Free Download. Show all posts
Jennifer E. Bethel; Julia Liebeskind
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, Special Issue: Corporate Restructuring. (Summer, 1993),
pp. 15-31.
This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and corporate restructuring in a sample of 93 surviving public Fortune 500 firms during the period 1981-87. The results show that blockholder ownership is associated significantly with corporate restructuring, suggesting that many managers restructured their corporations during the 19802 only when pressured to do so by large shareholders.
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Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, Special Issue: Corporate Restructuring. (Summer, 1993),
pp. 15-31.
This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and corporate restructuring in a sample of 93 surviving public Fortune 500 firms during the period 1981-87. The results show that blockholder ownership is associated significantly with corporate restructuring, suggesting that many managers restructured their corporations during the 19802 only when pressured to do so by large shareholders.
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by. J. Lawrence French
The Academy of Management Review, Vol.12, No.3. (Jul., 1987), pp.427-435.
This paper explores employee ownership as financial investment rather than a mechanisme of control. Viewed from such a perspective, relations among employee ownership, satisfaction, and desired influence are more complex than supposed. Employee owners' satisfaction with the firm and their jobs depends, in part of their perceptions of the firm's financial performance and of the effectiveness of other employees. Dissatisfaction may increase efforts by employee owners to influence decision making.
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The Academy of Management Review, Vol.12, No.3. (Jul., 1987), pp.427-435.
This paper explores employee ownership as financial investment rather than a mechanisme of control. Viewed from such a perspective, relations among employee ownership, satisfaction, and desired influence are more complex than supposed. Employee owners' satisfaction with the firm and their jobs depends, in part of their perceptions of the firm's financial performance and of the effectiveness of other employees. Dissatisfaction may increase efforts by employee owners to influence decision making.
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Robert G. Hansen; John R. Lott, Jr.
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.31, No.1. (Mar.,1996), pp.43-68.
If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want value maximization to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values. This occurs when firms internalize between-firms externalities. Any kind of externality, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, vertical or horizontal, suffices. What matters is simply that one company's actions affect another's value. Thus, besides the tradional benefit of risk reduction, portfolio deversification offers additional benefits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities.
This paper documents the extent of diversification and cross-ownership of stocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the extent of cross-ownership.
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The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.31, No.1. (Mar.,1996), pp.43-68.
If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want value maximization to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values. This occurs when firms internalize between-firms externalities. Any kind of externality, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, vertical or horizontal, suffices. What matters is simply that one company's actions affect another's value. Thus, besides the tradional benefit of risk reduction, portfolio deversification offers additional benefits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities.
This paper documents the extent of diversification and cross-ownership of stocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the extent of cross-ownership.
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Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals
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Journal of Finance,
ownership
Lilli A. Gordon; John Pound
The Journal of Finance, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1993), pp.697-718.
This paper examines how information and ownership structure affect voting outcomes on shareholders sponsored proposal to change corporate governance structure. We find that the outcomes of votes vary systematically with the governance and performance records of target firms, the identity of proposal sponsors, and the type of proposal. We also find that outcomes vary significantly as a function of ownership by insiders, institutions, outside blockholders, ESOPs, and outside directors who are blockholders. These results suggest that both public information and ownership structure have a significant influence on voting outcomes.
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The Journal of Finance, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1993), pp.697-718.
This paper examines how information and ownership structure affect voting outcomes on shareholders sponsored proposal to change corporate governance structure. We find that the outcomes of votes vary systematically with the governance and performance records of target firms, the identity of proposal sponsors, and the type of proposal. We also find that outcomes vary significantly as a function of ownership by insiders, institutions, outside blockholders, ESOPs, and outside directors who are blockholders. These results suggest that both public information and ownership structure have a significant influence on voting outcomes.
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Mike Burkart; Denis Gromb; Fausto Panunzi
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.112, No.3. (Aug.,1997), pp.693-728.
We proposed that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discreation come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriantion threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature ussualy associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.112, No.3. (Aug.,1997), pp.693-728.
We proposed that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discreation come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriantion threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature ussualy associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.
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A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance
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CSR,
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The Academy of Management Review
Archie B. Carroll
The Academy of Management Review, Vol.4, No.4.(Oct.,1979),pp.497-505.
Offered here is a conceptual model that comprehendively describes essential aspects of corporate social performance. The three aspects of the model address major questions of concern to academics and managers alike: (1) What is included in corporate social responsibility? (2) What are the social issues the organization must address? and (3) What is the organization's philosophy or mode of social reponsiveness?
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The Academy of Management Review, Vol.4, No.4.(Oct.,1979),pp.497-505.
Offered here is a conceptual model that comprehendively describes essential aspects of corporate social performance. The three aspects of the model address major questions of concern to academics and managers alike: (1) What is included in corporate social responsibility? (2) What are the social issues the organization must address? and (3) What is the organization's philosophy or mode of social reponsiveness?
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The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value
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Management Science,
ownership
Steven Huddart
Management Science, Vol.39, No.11. (Nov.,1993), pp.1407-1421.
This article analyzes the value of a corporation as a function of its ownership structure. Shareholders can acquire costly information about the manager's effort to produce output. Concentrating share ownership leads the largest shareholder to (i) acquire more precise signals of effort and (ii) modify the compensation contract. Better monitoring increases output, and hence firm value. However, the (risk averse) large shareholder bears more idiosyncratic firm risk as his stake in the firm increases. These forces equilibrate at a unique welfare maximizing ownershop structure. Under a strong condition on the purchase or sale of shares by large stock holders, investors have incentives to trade toward the ownership structure that maximizes the social surplus. When all investors are price takers only a diffuse ownership structure can arrise in a competitive equilibrium.
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Management Science, Vol.39, No.11. (Nov.,1993), pp.1407-1421.
This article analyzes the value of a corporation as a function of its ownership structure. Shareholders can acquire costly information about the manager's effort to produce output. Concentrating share ownership leads the largest shareholder to (i) acquire more precise signals of effort and (ii) modify the compensation contract. Better monitoring increases output, and hence firm value. However, the (risk averse) large shareholder bears more idiosyncratic firm risk as his stake in the firm increases. These forces equilibrate at a unique welfare maximizing ownershop structure. Under a strong condition on the purchase or sale of shares by large stock holders, investors have incentives to trade toward the ownership structure that maximizes the social surplus. When all investors are price takers only a diffuse ownership structure can arrise in a competitive equilibrium.
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by. Alan Bauerschmidt
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Jul.,1993), pp. 397-399.
A comment on Gilbert's 'The Twilight of Corporate Strategy'
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Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Jul.,1993), pp. 397-399.
A comment on Gilbert's 'The Twilight of Corporate Strategy'
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Stock Rebuilding Strategies under Uncertainty: The Case for "Sentinel Fisheries" read abstract
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Successful Antitakeover Defenses, Top Management Turnover and Stock Prices read abstract
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Firm Ownership and Investment Efficiency in Chinaread abstract
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Leverage and Investment in Diversified Firmsread abstract
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Ownership Structure, Financial Constraints and Investment Decisions: Evidence from Panel of Italian Firmsread abstract
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- A Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation free download
- Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance free download
- Value Based Management: Economic Value Added or Cash Value Added? free download
Information Risk and the Cost of Debt Capitalby. Sattar A. Mansi , William F. Maxwell , and Darius P. Miller
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Earnings and Stock Splitsby. Paul Asquith; Paul Healy; Krishna Palepu
The Accounting Review, Vol. 64,No. 3.(Jul.,1989), pp. 387-403.
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The Market Reaction to the Choice of Accounting Method for Stock Splits and Large Stock Dividends Graeme Rankine; Earl K. Stice
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.32, No.2. (Jun.,1997), pp.161-182.
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Split or Dividend: Do the Words Really Matter?James A. Millar
The Accounting Review, Vol.52,No.1. (Jan.,1977), pp.52-55.
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Stock Dividends, Stock Splits, and Signalingby. Maureen Mcnichols; Ajay Dravid
The Journal of Finance, Vol.45,No.3, Papersand Proceedings, Forty-ninth Annual Meeting,
American Finance Association, Atlanta, Georgia, December 28-30, 1989. (Jul.,1990), pp.
857-879.
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- Successful Antitakeover Defenses, Top Management Turnover and Stock Prices free download
- Stock Rebuilding Strategies under Uncertainty: The Case for "Sentinel Fisheries" free download
- Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-Market Repurchase Programs free download
- Corporate Repurchases of Already Outstanding Common Stock free download
- Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing? free download
- Equity Undervaluation and Decisions Related to Repurchase Tender Offers: An
- Empirical Investigation free download
- The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs free download
- Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases free download
- Monitoring as a Motivation for IPO Underpricing free download
- Multi-Dimensional Signaling with Fixed-Price Repurchase Offers free download
- Share Repurchase and Takeover Deterrence free download
- Should A Corporation Repurchase Its Own Stock? free download
- Stock Repurchase as a Takeover Defense free download
- Stockholder Distribution Decisions: Share Repurchases on Dividends?: Discussion free download
- The Effect of Share Repurchase on the Value of the Firm: Reply free download
- The Effect of Share Repurchase on the Value of the Firm free download
- The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition free download
- The Value of Open Market Repurchases of Closed-End Fund Shares free download
- Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock? free download
- Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements and Revaluation of Prior
Accounting Information free download
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